Does moral philosophy rest on a mistake?1912

Prichard argues that with time, students become disillusioned by moral philosophy's increasingly obscure aim. He contents that the whole subject rests on a mistake, the same mistake upon which rests the Theory of Knowledge. The nature of the demand which originates the subject is clear: we feel the force of obligations we carry out and wonder "Why am I doing ts? I should be straight enjoying my life type". We ask why? Then, moral philosophizing is merely and answer to this question, that is, to supply a proof for what we previously believed when such a proof was not present or thought about. Almost theological ontology: an entire theoretical apparatus is created to justify a previous presupposition. But this existed independently of our reflection. The moral question is answered by either saying that we should do the thing because the result is good, or do the thing because the thing itself is good. Let us call these Answer 1 and Answer 2.

Personal desire is not sufficient to justify acting on moral rules. It only provides a reason as to wanting to keep an obligation, nut not why we ought or should do so. Simply put, if we ask "Why keep an obligation that hurts me?" such as promising to the friends that one will see them and then bail like Bond. The usual answer is to say that keeping the promise will male people happy, and thus us too. This only gives us a reason to want to keep doing it, but not as to why we are obligates morally to keep doing it. \[ \underbrace{\text{Desire}}_{\text{One does } X} \to \underbrace{\text{Utility}}_{X \text{ benefits me}} \to \underbrace{\text{Consequence}}_{X \text{ makes people happy}} \neq \underbrace{\text{Duty}}_{\text{One ought to do } X}\] Plato, Mill, and others try to convince us that morality is profitable in this sense. Huge mistake for Prichard. A mistake that arises because of how we usually answer this sort of question i.e "Why game all night?" Because it is fun. "Why tip?" Because the American waiter who is in the 90th percentile of global earners will be sad :( The answer to "Why X?" is consequentialist ontology (with respect to good things happening). Answering why we should want to do something is not the same as why we ought to do it. According to this bozo (no disrespect) Kant is close to distinguishing this in separating the categorical imperative (Do \(X\)) and hypothetical imperative (If you want \(Y\), do \(X\)).

Let us remember Answer 1, which is basically utilitarianism i.e. good is not limited to pleasure. So if something is good we should do whatever action brings it forth as consequence. But here is a missing link happiness is good \(\Rightarrow\) ought to produce happiness is missing an intermediate step in which we assume that what is good ought to be. But then we explained that first ought with this second ought. Like always in these consequentialist designs we encounter fatal tautology. Even then \(X\) ought to be does not clearly imply that we ought to do \(X\). Moral obligation remains unaddressed.

Then, for Prichard, Answer 2 has much more appeal: things are good in it of themseleves. But what does this really mean? These actions have two possible mpotives behind them: duty, or because it is done with a good desire or intention behind it. He claims that both posit problems. Firstly, acting out of duty means that if goodness comes from duty, then the duty comes before the goodness (apprehension of its goodness will presuppose the sense that we ought to do it). This fallacy places motive as the basis for goodness hat was thought intrinsic. But as much as consequence is of no matter (we should clearly distinguish between the child that elbows their sibling out of malice tot the one that did so by accident and no motive), we should also understand that the right action may be done with wrong intentions or motive (a murderer fetishist resists his urges out of fear). The questions is if we ought to do something, not whether we ought to do it for x or y reason.

So what does Prichard think? It looks to me as a form of ex nihilo, what we ought to do follows from nothing. We get put in the position, evaluate, and just know. A view that some call intuitionism. Here we may have to follow our consequence to see the effect of our actions, and notice what relations are in place. He then tries to disentangle virtue and morality by claiming that they are different types of goodness. The former being no basis for the latter. A virtuous action is done willingly, and a moral one out of duty. You may have one or the other or both. Finally, he gives a pay-off to his comparison or parallel with the Theory of Knowledge. We notice that we make mistakes, and then doubt it and look for proof that we did have knowledge all along. To really know that \(A=B\), we first had to know that we knew it, then to know that we knew that we knew it, and so on. This doubt is not genuine, because the question is actually "Was the belief true?". To doubt whether it was knowledge we have to think of it as only belief. Thus, there can be no such thing as a Theory of Knowledge.

Overall, this was a challenging read, I hope it was written more clearly. I deeply agree with the criticism on Utilitarianism which I already espoused, bit this attacking the other side was maybe something that I had not thought about as deeply and in that I have learned something. I know that both sides have responded to him, and I am not sure that I agree with his intuition proposition, but it is a very interesting read nonetheless.